From Mumbai 26/11 to the Pahalgam attack, Pakistan’s ISI has repeatedly used terror strikes in India to manage internal rifts between Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Beyond ideology, the latest assault also targeted Kashmir’s booming tourism industry, exposing how ISI’s strategy mixes violence, propaganda, and proxy turf wars.
When the recent Pahalgam terror attack shook Jammu and Kashmir, it became increasingly clear that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was not just targeting civilians but also seeking to destabilize the region’s economy by disrupting its booming tourism sector. Since the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, Jammu and Kashmir has witnessed several positive changes, the most visible of which is the resurgence of tourism. Millions of tourists have thronged the Valley in recent years, restoring livelihoods and reviving local businesses. For Pakistan, this progress stands in stark contrast to its propaganda narrative, making tourism a prime target for disruption.
But tourism was not the only factor behind the Pahalgam strike. A deeper, more complex story of rivalry, reconciliation, and strategic manipulation lies beneath. At the heart of this episode is the growing rift between two of Pakistan’s most notorious terror outfits — Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Both have historically focused on Jammu and Kashmir, but over the last year and a half, ideological and operational differences have widened their gap. For the ISI, which relies heavily on both groups to further its cross-border agenda, this was a situation that demanded urgent intervention.
A Familiar Playbook
This is not the first time the ISI has used India as the stage to manage internal differences within its terror proxies. The Mumbai 26/11 attacks provide a chilling precedent. The plan for the 2008 attack was originally conceived by Ilyas Kashmiri, the head of Al-Qaeda’s 313 Brigade. Kashmiri, who was known for his larger ambition of launching the “Ghazwa-e-Hind” project, shared his ideas with David Headley, who later confirmed the details during his testimony.
At that time, Pakistan’s ISI was struggling to contain tensions between JeM and LeT. Both groups were eager to divert fighters to Afghanistan, where the Taliban was losing ground against US forces. However, ISI wanted its assets focused on Jammu and Kashmir and India. To prevent the cadres from moving away, ISI persuaded Kashmiri to hand over the Mumbai attack plan to LeT. The devastating attack on Mumbai not only served as a diversionary tactic but also helped repair the rift between the two terror organizations.
Pahalgam: A Repeat of the Strategy
The Pahalgam attack follows a disturbingly similar script. Intelligence inputs suggest that the Lashkar-e-Taiba was unhappy with the ISI’s preferential treatment of JeM in recent times. JeM cadres were reportedly being given safer routes and greater freedom for infiltration into India, while LeT operatives were asked to rely solely on existing networks already inside J&K. This imbalance caused deep resentment.
Even efforts by the Pakistani Army to mediate between the groups failed. The Lashkar demanded a high-profile strike to reassert its importance. Eventually, ISI green-lighted the Pahalgam attack, commissioning Lashkar operatives to execute it while allowing JeM to continue infiltrations elsewhere. This “division of labor” was intended to cool tempers and ensure both groups remained aligned with ISI’s broader objectives in Kashmir.
The extent of the rift had become evident earlier when Jaish terrorists killed Qari Abdul Rehman, the chief financier of LeT and a relative of its chief, Hafiz Saeed. Such incidents underscored the volatility of the relationship between the two outfits.
Ideological and Strategic Fault Lines
While ISI may have temporarily papered over the differences, Indian security agencies warn that such unity will likely be short-lived. The rivalry is not limited to operational favoritism but also extends to ideology. Lashkar-e-Taiba follows the Ahl-i Hadith tradition rooted in the 18th-century ideologue Shah Waliullah Dehlavi. Jaish-e-Muhammad, on the other hand, aligns with the Deobandi school, a revivalist Sunni movement. These sectarian and theological divides add another layer of friction to their uneasy partnership.
Broader Implications
The Pahalgam attack highlights three critical aspects of Pakistan’s strategy. First, it demonstrates the ISI’s willingness to sacrifice innocent lives in India to manage internal conflicts among its terror assets. Second, it underscores how disrupting Kashmir’s economic revival, especially its thriving tourism sector, remains a central Pakistani goal. Third, it shows that the ISI continues to employ the same tactics it used during 26/11 — exporting terror to India not only to destabilize the region but also to consolidate its control over proxy groups.
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For India, these developments reinforce the need for heightened vigilance and intelligence coordination. The stakes are not only about preventing terror strikes but also about protecting the hard-won peace and prosperity that ordinary Kashmiris have begun to experience.
While the ISI may have succeeded in temporarily uniting JeM and LeT, the deeper ideological rifts suggest that this unity is fragile. What is certain, however, is that Pakistan’s strategy of leveraging terror, tourism, and turf wars will continue to shape the security landscape of South Asia.
